Taleb has made his living (and a small fortune, perhaps transformed into a large fortune by the 2008 market) in an unusual way-by financial speculation in contexts in which he spots a small chance of making a very large gain. As with others who have had unusual careers (say, Neil Armstrong or Marcel Marceau), it is interesting to hear his experiences, but when such a person declares I am a philosopher of ideas, one is wise to be cautious (italics denote quotes from Taleb, boldface denotes my own emphasis).
The phrase "Black Swan" (arising earlier in the different context of Popperian falsification) is here defined as an event characterized [p. xviii] by rarity, extreme impact, and retrospective (though not prospective) predictability, and Taleb's thesis is that such events have much greater effect, in financial markets and the broader world of human affairs, than we usually suppose. The book is challenging to review because it requires considerable effort to separate the content from the style. The style is rambling and pugnacious-well described by one reviewer as "with few exceptions, the writers and professionals Taleb describes are knaves or fools, mostly fools. His writing is full of irrelevances, asides and colloquialisms, reading like the conversation of a raconteur rather than a tightly argued thesis". And clearly this is perfectly deliberate. Such a book invites a review that reflects the reviewer's opinions more than is customary in the Notices. My own overall reaction is that Taleb is sensible (going on prescient) in his discussion of financial markets and in some of his general philosophical thought but tends toward irrelevance or ridiculous exaggeration otherwise. Let me run through some discussion topics, first six on which I broadly agree with Taleb, then six on which I broadly disagree, then five final thoughts.
(1) [p. 286] The sterilized randomness of games does not resemble randomness in real life; thinking it does constitutes the Ludic Fallacy (his neologism). This is exactly right, and mathematicians should pay attention. In my own list of one hundred instances of chance in the real world, exactly one item is "Explicit games of chance based on artifacts with physical symmetry-exemplified by dice, roulette, lotteries, playing cards, etc." (2) Taleb is dismissive of prediction and models (explicitly in finance and econometrics, and implicitly almost everywhere (
d) What we see is not necessarily all that is there. History hides Black Swans from us [if they didn't happen] and gives a mistaken idea about the odds of these events: this is the distortion of silent evidence.
Financial markets differ from casinos in many ways, but they are almost equally unrepresentative of the operation of chance in other aspects of the real world. Thinking otherwise is the Agoran fallacy.
Here are three facets of this fallacy. (a) Money is "simply additive"-your career investment profit is the sum of your profits and losses each day. The rest of life doesn't work that way-your happiness today isn't a sum of incremental happiness and unhappiness of previous days.
(b) In financial speculation one doesn't care about actual outcomes, merely about the competitive issue of being able to guess outcomes better than others can, like "betting against the spread" on football. But in most important decisions under uncertainty (choosing a spouse, choosing a cancer treatment), one seeks desirable outcomes rather than to beat others.
(c) Imagine you have woken from a twentyfive-year sleep and want to catch up on what's happened. Taleb and I agree that looking at the roughly nine thousand daily headlines you missed would not be helpful-these are "just noise" from a long-term perspective. Taleb views Black Swans as the only alternative. But he ignores the cumulative effect of slow trends (because they are uninteresting to a speculator?). One can think of an endless list of slow changes in the United States over the last generation (increase in childhood obesity, increased consumption of espresso, increased proportion of occupations requiring a college education, increased visibility of pornography), as well as the more prominent ones (acceptability of a black president, increase in health care sector to around 16% of GDP). Consider a fifty-five-year-old thinking about changes in the United States over the last thirty years-how is the experience of being twenty-five in 2011 different from the experience of being twenty-five in 1981? Perhaps most obvious is the Internet (more precisely, the things we now do using the Internet) and the prevalence of laptop computers. This is a change that our fifty-five-year-old experienced as an individualwe remember the first time we used a browser or a search engine. We have a natural cognitive bias toward changes such as the Internet that we experienced as individuals rather than those such as "increase in childhood obesity" that we didn't. One can hardly quantify such matters, but contrary to Taleb I would assert Most of the differences in life experience from one generation to the next are the cumulative results of slow changes that do not have much impact on a typical individual and therefore that we don't pay much attention to. Of course in the long term the nature, time of origination, and duration of slow trends is unpredictable-but it first three are visually dramatic and may affect a large and unpredictable number of buildings at once (Extremistan); not so the fourth (Mediocristan); the first three appear in the news as "natural disasters" but the fourth doesn't. But none of this is relevant to the quantitative impact of such events, which is an empirical matter (termites win). Similarly, "number of deaths in different wars" is in Extremistan; childhood deaths from poor sanitation and consequent disease is in Mediocristan. Guess which caused more deaths worldwide in the twentieth century. That's an empirical matter (poor sanitation wins). So:
Extremistan is sometimes dramatic; Mediocristan is never dramatic. But this has no necessary connection with quantitative impact.
Setting aside drama aspects, the simple fact is that our minds focus on the variable aspects of life because we don't need to focus on the nonvariable aspects. If I ask you what you did yesterday, you don't tell me the usual things (commuting to work, brushing teeth, breathing), you tell me what was different about yesterday. If I ask you to describe your dog, you don't say "four legs, one tail, vocalizes by barking", you tell me how your dog differs from the average dog. So:
Our minds focus on variability. Extremistan is, by definition, more variable than Mediocristan, so it attracts relatively more of our attention. But this has no necessary connection with quantitative impact.
Turning to (b), take any example, even a standard "economic" one such as financial success of different movies. Most movies lose money; a few make enormous profits. So this aspect of the movie sector of the economy is indeed in Extremistan. But how much, and to whom, does this matter? The size of the sector (number of employed actors and technicians, number of cinemas) isn't affected in any obvious way by this variability, just by our taste for watching movies as opposed to other entertainment. Of the movies you and I enjoy, some were commercial successes and some were flops-how would our experience be different if the successes and failures were less extreme? Even an investor diversified across the movie business isn't much affected. It's hard to think of any very substantial consequences-for instance, logic suggests that in Extremistan one should "take risks" by making unconventional movies, but Hollywood is generally criticized for exactly the opposite, for making formulaic movies.
(8) In other words the whole Extremistan metaphor, suggesting a country in which everything is ruled by power laws, is misleading. A better metaphor is an agora, a marketplace, which is a useful component of a city but is surrounded by other components with different roles. This provides a segue to a quotable proclamation of my own. VOLUME 58, NUMBER 3 think about during a day, but (unlike a computer rebooting) we don't wake up, run through the gazillion, and consciously choose which to actually think about. For obvious reasons, in everyday life this question-What comes to one's conscious attention as matters one might want to think about?-is no big deal. But it's a central issue with Black Swans: if we believe there may be many lowprobability high-impact future events that we can't imagine this moment, how much effort should we put into trying to imagine them, and how do we go about doing so, anyway? Taleb what might happen to the USSR over the next ten years-"give me a range of possibilities and a probability for each"-then they would surely have included something like "peaceful breakup into constituent republics" and assigned it some small probability. What does it mean to say such a prediction is right or wrong? In 2008, the day before John McCain was scheduled to announce his VP choice, the Intrade prediction market gave Sarah Palin a 4% chance. Was this right or wrong? Unlikely events will sometimes happen just by chance. Taleb's whole thesis is that experts and markets do not assess small probabilities correctly, but he supports it with anecdote and rhetoric, not with data and analysis.
Five Final Thoughts
(13) If you haven't read The Black Swan, Taleb's online essay [3] is a shorter and more cohesive account of some of his ideas.
(14) Taleb often seems to imagine that the views he disagrees with come from some hypothetical Financial Math 101 course, though in one case it was an actual course [p. 278]: It seemed better to teach [MBA students at Wharton] a theory based on the Gaussian than to teach them no theory at all. It is easy to criticize introductory courses in any subject as concentrating on some oversimplified but easy-to-explain theory that is not so relevant to reality (e.g., many introductory statistics courses exaggerate the relevance and scope of tests of significance; physics courses say more about gravity than about friction). It is much harder to rewrite such a course to make it more realistic without degenerating into vague qualitative assertions or scattered facts. is this, not Black Swans, that actually constitute long-term unpredictability.
(9) The word prediction has a range of meaning. Stating "Microsoft stock will rise about 20% next year" is a deterministic prediction, whereas stating your opinion about the stock's performance as a probability distribution is a statistical prediction. Any attempt by a reader to make more precise sense of Taleb's rhetoric about prediction requires the reader to keep firmly in mind which meaning is under discussion, since Taleb isn't careful to do so. For instance, Taleb discusses [p. 150] data showing that security analysts' predictions are useless, as if this were a novel insight. But in this setting he is talking about deterministic prediction, and he is just repeating a central tenet of thirty years of academic theory (the efficient market hypothesis and all that), not to mention the classic best-seller [1] . On the other hand, the standard mathematical theory of finance starts with some statistical assumption-that prices will move like Brownian motion or some variant. Taleb's criticisms of this theory-that it ignores Black Swans, and that future probabilities are intrinsically impossible to assess well-have considerable validity, but he doesn't make sufficiently clear the distinction between this and traditional stockbroker advice.
(10) A book on (say) the impact of empires on human history might be expected to contain an explicit list of entities the author considered as empires; that way, a reader could analyze any asserted generality about empires by pondering whether it applied to at least most empires on the list. Similarly, one might expect this book to contain some explicit list of past events the author considered Black Swans (here I am thinking of unique Black Swans, not Gray Swans). But it doesn't; various instances are certainly mentioned, but mostly via asides and anecdotes. If you read the book and extracted the mentioned instances, and then read it again to see how much of the material was directly relevant to most of the listed Black Swans, then it would be a very small proportion. In other words, the summary (6) of Taleb's views is interesting, but instead of expanding the summary to more concrete and detailed analysis, the book rambles around scattered philosophical thoughts.
(11) The style of Taleb's philosophizing can be seen in the table [p. 284] "Skeptical Empiricism vs Platonism", in which he writes a column of ideas that he explicitly identifies with and contrasts this with another column that no one would explicitly identify with. This is straw man rhetoric. Indeed, much of the book is rhetoric about empiricism, with a remarkable lack of actual empiricism, i.e., rational argument from data.
(12) This love of rhetoric causes Taleb to largely ignore what I would consider interesting philosophical questions related to Black Swans. Here are two such. There are a gazillion things we might (15) I am always puzzled that writers on financial mathematics (Taleb included) tend to ignore what strikes me as the most important insight that mathematics provides. Common sense and standard advice correctly emphasize a trade-off between short-term risk and long-term reward, implicitly suggesting that this spectrum goes on forever. But it doesn't. At least, if one could predict probabilities accurately, there is a "Kelly strategy" that optimizes long-term return. This strategy, the subject of the popular book [2] , carries a very specific level of short-term risk, given by the remarkable formula with chance p % your portfolio value will sometimes drop below p% of its initial value. Now actual stock markets are less volatile, and consequently one of the best (fixed, simple) investment strategies for a U.S. investor over the last fifty years has been to invest about 140% of their net financial assets in stocks (by borrowing money). It is easy to say that [p. 61] The sources of Black Swans today have multiplied beyond measurability and imply that this is a source of increased market volatility, but it is equally plausible or implausible to conjecture that mathematically based speculative activity is pushing the stock market toward the "Kelly" level of volatility.
(16) My own investment philosophy, as someone who devotes three hours a year to his investments, is:
As a default, assume the future will be statistically similar to the past. Not because this is true in any Platonic sense, but because anyone who says different is trying to sell you something.
(17) The Black Swan illustrates a general phenomenon that authors who deal with chance in specific contexts (finance, the logic of scientific inference, physics, luck in everyday life, philosophy, risks to the world economy, evolution, algorithmic complexity,…) can be very perceptive within these contexts, yet, by not keeping in mind the full extent of real-world occurrences of chance, assert generalizations about chance that are silly outside their particular context. An amusing antidote to such generalizations is to examine the contexts in which "ordinary people" perceive chance. For some data on this, derived from 100,000 queries to a search engine, see http://www.stat.berkeley. edu/~aldous/Real-World/bing_chance.html.
